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How Do Institutional Investors Trade?† 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a novel, and detailed custody trades dataset, this paper analyzes the trading 
behavior of institutions. Extant studies have examined the effects of past performance on 
trading by retail investors, day traders, and futures floor traders. Yet very little work has 
been done on institutions. We find that unlike other investors, institutions take on more 
risk following an increase in net profit and loss.  However, the responses to a gain and 
loss are highly asymmetric. Institutions aggressively reduce risk in the wake of losses, 
but only mildly increase risk in the wake of gains. This asymmetry is more pronounced 
for experienced and older funds. Further, the performance dependence varies over the 
calendar year, and manifests itself at the security but not at the portfolio level. We relate 
these findings to the behavioral theories of narrow framing, dynamic loss aversion, and 
overconfidence. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The link between risk-taking and past performance has recently come to prominence in 
the finance literature, and for good reason. On the empirical front, studies have shown 
that retail investors (Odean, 1988; Barber and Odean, 2000), day traders (Linnainmaa, 
2003), futures floor traders (Locke and Mann, 2001; 2003), market makers (Coval and 
Shumway, 2001), and casino gamblers (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) exhibit performance 
dependence. On the theoretical front, the resultant behavioral theories of overconfidence, 
dynamic loss aversion, narrow framing, and disposition offer powerful explanations for 
financial market anomalies like the equity premium (Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001), 
stock market participation (Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2003), momentum (Grinblatt 
and Han, 2002), and return predictability (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 2001). 
 
With some exceptions, the bulk of empirical research has looked at the equity trading of 
retail investors. However, institutional investor asset holdings now dwarf directly-held 
individual holdings in G7 countries, especially the U.S. and the U.K. As of 1997, the 
ratio of institutional to direct holdings was 1.5 across G7 households (Davis, 2000).1 
Despite this, virtually no empirical work2 has been done on this dominant investor class. 
It may be that institutional investors mimic individual investors in their sensitivity to past 
performance, but there are good reasons why this might not be the case.  
 
It is natural to think that sophisticated institutional investors might be less susceptible to 
behavioral biases than retail investors or day traders. In their analysis of brokerage 
investors in the Israeli market, Shapira and Venezia (2001) find that those who trade 
professionally are less prone to disposition effects than independent investors. Dhar and 
Zhu (2002) show that a full one-fifth of their investors are immune to the disposition 
effect. Attributes that temper the behavioral biases include education, professional 
                                                 
1 Institutional holdings equal 100 percent of GDP in G7 countries, and 200 percent in the U.S. and U.K. 
(Davis and Steil, 2001). 
2 One exception is Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000; 2001) who show using trades on Finnish stocks that 
foreign institutional investors tend to be momentum traders and are less susceptible to holding on to their 
losses than the Finnish investors.  However it remains to be seen whether their findings based on Finnish 
stocks are representative of the institutional investor class as a whole. 
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occupation, and income levels. It is fair to say that institutional investors are probably 
more educated, better trained, and better paid than most retail investors. Further, these 
investors may have internalized popular investment advice on the importance of not 
holding on to one’s losses. They may also harbor attitudes towards risk-taking different 
from those of commodity traders and market makers.  
 
Alternatively, there are many non-behavioral reasons why institutions investors may 
exhibit performance dependence.3 On one hand, institutions may elect to sell their 
winners to maintain a desired asset allocation balance, or because the fundamental values 
they were seeking at the time they put on the trades have been realized. On the other 
hand, institutions may be constrained by capital requirements. When faced with losses, 
they have to reduce exposures. Conversely, after a series of gains, they can afford to 
increase exposures. Related to this, these investors may be mechanically following risk-
management driven drawdown rules that specify that exposures be cut once losses exceed 
a certain cutoff., perhaps with reference to value-at-risk (VaR). Also, institutions may 
follow momentum strategies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 
2000). If institutions are net long, a surge in prices simultaneously induces gains and 
motivates institutions to increase their positions to capture momentum profits. Moreover, 
there may be tax effects towards the end of the calendar year (Lakonishok and Smidt, 
1986; Badrinath and Lewellen, 1991), though such effects are much more relevant in 
analyzing the behavior of underlying stakeholders such as retail investors. Lastly, 
managerial performance incentives may be driving the performance dependence. Many 
managers receive incentive fees that create option-like payoffs based on performance. 
These option-like payoffs can cause risk taking to fluctuate in response to past 
performance. 
 
 
                                                 
3 We hasten to add that these explanations, with the exception of risk management concerns, can also apply 
to individual investors. However, Odean (1998) writes that the strong preference to dispose of winners 
rather than losers displayed by the retail investors in his dataset cannot be attributed to portfolio 
rebalancing, subsequent portfolio performance, transactions costs, or tax considerations.  Barberis and 
Thaler (2002) concur that it is hard to account for these effects on rational grounds. 
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This paper builds on and extends the literature on performance dependence to 
institutional investors. We ask: Are institutional investor trades influenced by their past 
gains and losses? If so, what drives this performance dependence? Do institutions behave 
like retail investors vis à vis their attitudes to risk-taking? Our medium is a proprietary, 
custody dataset encompassing the complete currency trades of 512 large institutional 
funds over the period 1994-2002. While some of these funds also manage equities and 
fixed income securities, there are some good reasons to look in the first instance at their 
currency activity. First, more so than equity or fixed income trades, currency trading 
tends to be driven by the fund manager rather than the underlying fund stakeholder. This 
is especially true in the case where the currencies are being managed as part of a hedging 
strategy, referred to by practitioners as “currency overlay.” Second, forward currency 
contracts are derivatives in zero net supply. This eliminates the possibility of aggregate 
capital gains or losses at the level of each currency, which alters the pricing implications 
that come from theories such as the Grinblatt and Han (2002) model. Third, the 
currencies traded by institutions are often owned by other institutions who wish to hedge 
their currency risks. Both institutional parties do not pay capital gains taxes, and only the 
underlying stakeholders of those other institutions do. Hence, when examining currency 
trades, we are unlikely to observe any tax-loss selling effects, since these currency trades 
are twice removed from the underlying stakeholder.4 
 
Our main findings are striking. Past performance manifestly affects risk-taking, but the 
sign and magnitude of this effect differs substantially from what has been observed for 
individual investors. Unlike other investors, institutional investors do not seem 
susceptible to disposition effects. Rather, institutions aggressively reduce risk in the wake 
of losses. Profits do bring some increase in risk-taking, but this increase reverses within a 
calendar quarter. These results are pervasive across the major currencies, characterizing 
some 95% of the trading volume in our data.  
 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking this argument only applies to pure currency funds. Nonetheless, the currency trades of 
bond and equity funds are still once-removed from the underlying stakeholder. 
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In teasing out an explanation for these patterns, we examine both rational and behavioral 
stories. Clearly, the story that institutional performance dependence is driven by asset 
allocation concerns cannot hold as the observed reactions to gains and losses run counter 
to that predicted by the portfolio rebalancing story.  
 
We find that capital constraints and risk management concerns have difficulty explaining 
the bulk of the performance dependence we observe. The reaction to losses occurs over a 
wide range of loss cutoffs. Unless, we make the drastic assumption that cutoff rules take 
effect more than 40% of the time when losses are incurred, maximum drawdown rules 
cannot be responsible for the performance dependence. Also, we find a noticeable lack of 
cross-currency effects. That is, only the P&L from the trades of the same currency matter 
to risk-taking for that currency, and not the P&L from the trades on other currencies by 
the same fund. This makes it difficult to forward the capital constraints explanation, 
which necessarily implies that performance dependence operates at the portfolio level 
and not only at the account level. Other results suggest that momentum trading cannot 
adequately account for the performance dependence. Managerial performance incentives 
also have problems accounting for the performance dependence. The induced convex 
payoff structures imply that risk-taking should increase and not decrease following 
losses. 
 
While the evidence is generally not supportive of the capital constraints, stop-loss, 
momentum, and managerial performance incentives explanations, they fit closely with 
the behavioral view. In particular, the absence of cross-account effects suggests that 
institutional investors are narrow framers in the sense of Barberis, Huang, and Thaler 
(2003) and Kahneman (2003). That is they tend to make their decisions based on 
information that is most accessible, i.e., past own currency P&L rather than past other 
currency P&L. Also, the increase in risk-taking following gains is consistent with a 
generalized overconfidence model (Barber and Odean, 2001) where investors 
misattribute their past successes to their own abilities. Finally, the decrease in risk-taking 
following losses is reminiscent of dynamic loss aversion (Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 
2001) where investors become more risk averse following losses.  
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We trace out further evidence supportive of the behavioral view. We find that the 
performance dependence varies systematically with the calendar period. The effects of 
gains dominate in the first half of the year while the effects of losses dominate in the 
second half. It is difficult to explain why cutoff rules matter more in the second half of 
the year or why capital constraints are binding more for gains in the first half of the year. 
One simple explanation is that fund managers care more about losses at the end of the 
year when performance evaluation looms. Moreover, we find that the effects of gains are 
attenuated for older and more experienced funds. Other researchers have shown that 
overconfidence also falls with age and experience (Barber and Odean, 2000). Taken 
together, these results gel with the view that the reaction to gains is driven by 
overconfidence. Interestingly, we do not find the same effect for losses. Experienced and 
older funds tend to reduce risk more than rookie or younger funds in the wake of losses. 
One view is that these funds are more disciplined than other funds and have internalized 
standard investment advice not to hold on to losses. Similarly, one reason why we do not 
find disposition effects in our sample is that institutional investors are simply more 
disciplined and better trained than say retail investors or day traders. Our take on the 
disposition effect dovetails with that in Dhar and Zhu (2002), Shapira and Venezia 
(2001), and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000; 2001).   
 
It is important to emphasize that the results in this paper are not explicitly about the 
preferences of currency traders or even fund managers per se. Rather they are about the 
preferences of institutions. The working assumption is that performance contracts, 
compensation, managerial training, and the like, are all in place to align managerial 
incentives with what is best for the fund. That is, the traders and managers are acting in 
the best interest of the funds. Our issue is not with the layer of agency that comes 
between the manager and the fund. Rather we wish to learn more about the preferences of 
the institutions through their risk-taking behavior. In this sense, we treat institutions as 
single entities and leave the agency issues for further research.    
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the nature and 
characteristics of our dataset. Section 3 presents the basic empirical results which link 
past gains and losses with changes in risk-taking, both unconditionally, and conditional 
on currency and fund type. Section 4 tests whether the results are driven by institutional 
investor capital constraints and risk management concerns. Section 5 investigates the 
possibility that momentum trading and managerial performance incentives are 
responsible for the observed performance dependence. A discussion of the view that 
behavioral biases influence their reaction to gains and losses follows in Section 6. Section 
7 concludes.   
2. Data 
The data used in the analysis is provided by State Street Corporation, one of the world's 
largest investor services providers. State Street clients are primarily large institutional 
money managers, and the total of all funds serviced by the Corporation at the end of our 
sample was USD 8.4 trillion, approximately 16 percent of total global assets. Our sample 
covers the period December 31st, 1993―January 1st, 2003, and comprises over 8 million 
individual trade records undertaken by some 8,500 anonymous funds. Each record 
provides us with the currency pair traded, the exchange rate, and the tenor or duration of 
the contract. 
 
Given the distributional assumptions needed for estimation, quality of the data series is 
important. Hence the analysis is restricted to the larger funds in the universe, as these 
tend to have more frequent, continuous trading. Moreover, only trades in the 10 major 
currencies are included.5 Mindful of survivorship bias, the requirement for inclusion in 
our sample is that a fund be in the 95th percentile of trading volume in one or more of six 
regularly sampled weeks over the nine-year sample period. This criterion selected a 
subset of 512 funds that account for an average of 72 percent of the volume across the 10 
currencies. 
 
                                                 
5 The list of currencies is: Danish kroner, Norwegian kroner, Swedish kroner, Swiss franc, British pound, 
Australian dollar, Japanese yen, New Zealand dollar, Canadian dollar and euro. Prior to 1999 synthetic euro 
return and flow series are constructed by weighting across the euro member countries. 
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There are a number of important fund characteristics to look at. The first is fund life. 
Although specific information on fund life is not available in the database, an 
examination of currency holdings makes it clear that most of the funds are not active in 
the currency markets for the entire sample. Indeed only two percent of the funds have 
nonzero currency holdings on every day of the sample. Of course, a fund manager may 
make an active decision to hold no open currency positions, so zero holdings may not 
imply that a fund is “dead.” Recognizing this, one way to proceed is to measure the life 
of each fund from the first day of nonzero holdings to the last day of nonzero holdings, 
and then to gauge the likelihood that this is a biased estimate from the incidence of zero 
holdings during this estimated life. Calculated in this way, the mean fund life is about 4.5 
years, while the incidence of zero exposure throughout fund life is only 12 percent, 
suggesting that the lifespan estimates are reasonable. A second important fund 
characteristic is base currency, since measured currency risk ought to exclude base-
currency holdings. The breakdown by base currency is as follows: U.S. dollar, 67 
percent; Australian dollar 12 percent; Canadian dollar 6 percent; euro 3 percent; Japanese 
yen 3 percent; British pound 3 percent; others 6 percent. Finally, as already mentioned, 
the underlying type of each fund is important. The database includes comprehensive 
information on the total holdings of each fund by asset class for the year 2001. Based on 
this, the funds are classified as fixed income, equity or currency for that year.6 The 
resulting categorization comprises 158 fixed income funds, 71 equity funds, and 149 
currency funds. 
 
2.1 Basic series 
The first step is to construct flow and holdings series for each fund across the currencies. 
Each day, net flows by currency, fund and tenor are measured.7 All flows on date t with 
tenor s are converted to dollars by dividing by the appropriate forward currency exchange 
rate stf , where f is units of foreign currency per dollar. Holdings are built up by 
cumulating these flows, after adjusting for mark-to-market gains and losses on each day's 
                                                 
6 Funds with fixed holdings in excess of equity holdings are defined as fixed income funds, and vice versa. 
Currency funds have no equity or fixed income positions. 
7 99 percent of the trades value within one year of trade date, so trades with maturity greater than 265 
trading days are ignored. 
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pre-existing positions. For a position with tenor s on date t-1, the marked-to-market gross 
return between date t-1 and t is st
s
t ff 1
1 / −
− , reflecting the fact that it is one day closer to 
maturity. It is these mark-to-market gains and losses that provide the key profit-and-loss 
(P&L) series that are used to measure performance. Any currency holdings that do come 
to maturity—that is, reach a tenor of zero―are treated as delivered, and removed from 
holdings on value date. This would occur, for example, if a fund purchased and took 
delivery of spot local currency to facilitate the purchase of an underlying equity or fixed 
income security. Such transactions are common for fixed income and equity funds, so 
negative serial correlation at short horizons is likely to be observed in the holdings series 
for such funds. 
 
With holdings in hand, it is a simple matter to calculate the second key series―a measure 
of risk exposure. Let hit be the vector of currency holdings for fund i on date t. Risk is 
measured as the standard quadratic form hit′ Σ hit, where Σ is the covariance matrix of 
annualized currency returns constructed from exponentially-weighted daily currency 
returns.8 The relevant Σ matrix differs according to the base currency of each fund. For 
example, a euro position held by a dollar-based fund entails much more risk than the 
same position held by a Scandinavian fund, relative to base currency. 
 
Figure 1 plots the holdings series for each of our currencies aggregated across all 512 
funds, grouped into four rough regions: North America, Japan and Antipodes, Europe and 
Scandinavia. There is a large amount of variation in the raw holdings numbers, and so to 
render them comparable, they are measured in units of trading days. For example, if a 
fund is long $5 million against the euro, and the fund's average daily EUR/USD volume 
is $1m, then it is counted as having 5 trading days worth of holdings. Figure 1 illustrates 
that, throughout the sample, funds have tended to be long the dollar and short other 
currencies. However, towards the end of the sample, this tendency waned considerably.  
 
                                                 
8 The exponential decay rate used is 0.998, implying a half-life of decay for past observations of about 350 
trading days. 
 10
Holdings tell only part of story, however, a fact that becomes abundantly clear when risk 
is examined. Figure 2 plots the aggregate risk exposure held by the funds in each of the 
currencies. Notice in particular that the exposure to the Japanese yen and British pound 
has remained quite high in the recent period. This implies that, individually, the funds in 
the universe continue to maintain large exposures to these currencies. Some funds are 
long and some funds are short, with the positions netting out to give an aggregate holding 
of close to zero. In other words, there is a considerable amount of disagreement across 
the fund positions. This cross-sectional richness contributes to the statistical power of the 
data sample. 
 
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 here] 
 
2.2 Persistence 
It is well-established that portfolio flows in underlying assets such as equities tend to be 
persistent (Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes, 2001). The question arises as to whether the 
same is true for institutional currency flows. Figure 3 (Panel A) plots the sample 
autocorrelation function for daily currency risk exposures out to 20 lags, together with 95 
percent confidence bands. The functions are plotted for three different levels of 
aggregation. The first level, “Aggregated by currency and fund,” adds up the total risk of 
all funds across all currencies to arrive at a single time series. The second level, 
“Aggregated by currency,” adds up the total risk across all funds in each currency 
separately, and shows the autocorrelation estimates for the currency panel. Analogously, 
the third level, “Aggregated by fund,” adds up the total risk across all currencies for each 
fund, and shows the autocorrelation estimates for the fund panel. At the aggregate and 
individual currency level, there is evidence of positive serial correlation at the 1-day and 
5-day frequencies. Interestingly, however, there is no such persistence at the individual 
fund level.9 Individual funds are not persistent in their actions, but funds tend to mimic 
one another. A substantially similar picture emerges from examination of weekly risk 
autocorrelations. Overall, this echoes the Froot and Tjornhom (2002) finding of 
                                                 
9 As mentioned earlier, the negative serial correlation evident at order two arises from the spot trades of 
fixed income and equity funds. 
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statistically significant cross-fund lags in equity flows to developed and emerging 
markets.  
 
Turning to performance, Figure 3 (Panel B) plots similar sample autocorrelation 
functions for P&L. Here there is no evidence of serial correlation, indicating that the 
lead-lag effects in risk-taking do not engender persistent performance. Again, the same is 
true at weekly frequencies. The interesting implication is that managers do not undergo 
cycles in profitability―for the most part, profits are independent from one period to the 
next. 
  
[Figure 3 here] 
 
3. Basic Dynamics 
In this section, the goal is to size up the degree of performance dependence that is 
present. We test if there is any link between risk-taking by institutional investors and 
lagged P&L, and seek to understand the sign of the relationship, if any. Other questions 
we address include: Is the performance dependence measured economically relevant? Are 
such effects pervasive across the commonly traded currencies? How does this 
performance dependence vary across various types of funds (i.e., currency, bond, and 
equity funds).  
 
The tool we use to address these basic questions is an unrestricted vector autoregression 
(VAR). The VAR is estimated at the weekly frequency to control for potential day-of-
the-week effects. Analogously to the serial correlation analysis presented above, we 
estimate panel VARs for risk and P&L at the aggregate, the currency, and the fund level. 
The model allows for heteroskedasticity across currencies and funds, and the lag length 
for each model is set at 13 weeks, the value selected by the Bayes-Schwartz Information 
Criterion for the panel fund regression. 
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Figure 4 shows the essential information that comes out of this exercise. The first column 
of plots in the figure shows the impact that a unit-standard deviation shock to P&L has on 
weekly risk, while the second column shows the impact that a unit-standard deviation 
shock to risk has on weekly P&L. The effects measured on the vertical axes are also 
scaled in standard deviation units, and 90 percent confidence intervals based on the 
maximum likelihood standard errors are sketched in lighter weight around each function. 
To calibrate, the one standard deviation P&L shocks at each level of aggregation are 
$163m, $43m, and $3.4m, while the shocks to annualized risk are $69m, $23m, and 
$3.2m. The own-equation effects are similar to those conveyed by Figures 3, and so are 
omitted. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Performance dependence is manifest in the data. At all levels of aggregation, past 
performance exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on risk-taking, and the 
impact persists for between six and eight weeks. For the panel fund regression, a one-
standard deviation shock to P&L produces a 3 percent standard deviation change in risk-
taking after four weeks. The economic impact is significant too: in dollar terms, the 
average shock to P&L for a fund is $3.4m, and this produces an increase in risk which 
elicits a change in annualized currency risk of $96,000 over the subsequent four weeks, 
or an incremental currency holding of $960,000.10 Importantly, the serial correlation 
estimates for P&L calculated earlier make clear that this result is not simply due to 
persistence in profits or losses.11 Turning to the second column of plots, there is no 
appreciable effect in the other direction: as might have been expected, increases in risk-
taking do not have a meaningful effect on profits. There is some indication that returns 
improve with risk-taking, though naturally risk rises in tandem with this. 
 
                                                 
10 With annualized currency volatility of approximately 10 percent, an increase of $96,000 in risk equates 
to an an increased holding of $960,000. 
11 In results not reported, we confirm that the changes in risk-taking arise from active trading rather than 
simply the passive changes in P&L. 
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Having investigated the basic relationship between risk-taking and P&L, we now turn to 
the cross-sectional features of the data. As shown in Table I, we are interested in 
understanding whether the effects identified are pervasive, in the sense that they apply 
across currencies and fund types. Looking in more detail at the cross-section also serves 
as a check on our basic results. If the performance dependence observed in Figure 4 is 
driven by trading on a few, infrequently traded currencies, then the results thus far are not 
very interesting as they only apply to a select group of institutional investors.  
 
[Table I here] 
 
Table I shows the effect of the first eight lags of P&L on risk-taking across each 
currency. The basic pattern observed in the full panel is seen to characterize seven of the 
ten currencies, the exceptions being Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand. Trading 
volume in these currencies is 1.25 percent, 2.43 percent, and 1.46 percent of total volume 
respectively. Thus the patterns measured earlier apply to the bulk of currency trading in 
our sample. 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
We also perform the same exercise for the various fund types described in Section 2. The 
impulse responses of risk to shocks in P&L for each fund type are depicted in Figure 5. 
Currency and bond funds display essentially the same sensitivity to past P&L as was 
documented earlier for the full group. Equity funds, by contrast, display a somewhat 
random response to past performance that is statistically insignificant. This accords with 
the folk wisdom that equity fund managers simply care less about the currency 
component of their returns. In all fairness, it must also be said that the statistical power of 
the equity sample is lower, since the number of equity funds, at 71, is about half the 
number of currency or bond funds in the sample. 
 
Overall, these basic results give rise to three broad interpretations. One view is that the 
observed performance dependence is mechanically driven by capital constraints. That is 
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when institutions are faced with large losses, they are forced to clamp down on risk 
taking as they can no longer afford to take up such large positions. Conversely, after 
institutions rack up an impressive string of wins, they are then able to increase their 
exposures given their greater asset base. A related view is that institutional investors 
follow stop-loss rules that require them to cut exposure in the wake of a significant loss. 
For example, a fund might close out a position if suffers a loss of more than 20%. Such 
stop-loss behavior would imply that the performance dependence we observe is driven by 
institutions’ reaction to losses rather than gains. 
 
Another view is that the observed performance dependence is motivated by rational 
concerns of institutions. For example, institutions could be following momentum 
strategies. When institutions are long, these strategies call for them to buy when currency 
prices rise and sell when currency prices fall. When institutions are short, these strategies 
require that they increase their short positions when currency prices fall and reduce their 
short positions when currency prices rise. In either case, such strategies may 
mechanically induce the risk and past P&L relationship we observe. This is true whether 
or not momentum trading of currencies is itself rational (LeBaron, 2002). Also, the 
observed performance dependence may be a result of the rational response of managers 
to their performance incentives. Many managers receive incentive fees that create option-
like payoffs based on performance. These option-like payoffs can cause risk taking to 
fluctuate in response to past performance. 
 
    
Yet, another view is that the observed performance dependence is fuelled by the 
behavioral biases of institutional fund managers. These behavioral biases include narrow 
framing, overconfidence, dynamic loss aversion, and disposition. The concept of narrow 
framing, expounded in Kahneman’s (2003) Nobel lecture, explains why people typically 
reject bets like a 50:50 chance to win $550 or lose $500. The idea is that an agent who is 
offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble to some extent in isolation, separate from her 
other risks. Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) show that narrow framing can help us 
understand the stock market participation and equity premium puzzles. Barber and Odean 
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(2001) argue that driven by overconfidence, single men trade more than single women 
and lose more money on their trades. Likewise, Glaser and Webber (2003) find that 
individuals who are more overconfident trade more than those who are less 
overconfident. On a different note, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) show that 
dynamic loss aversion can explain the “house money” effect, or the increased willingness 
to take on more risk following gains, observed among gamblers in casinos and 
documented by Thaler and Johnson (1990). Other studies have found that retail investors 
(Odean, 1988), day traders (Linnainmaa, 2003), and futures floor traders (Locke and 
Mann, 2003) are reluctant to realize their losses, i.e., these investors are prone to the 
disposition effect. However it remains to see whether institutions are susceptible to these 
biases. After all, Dhar and Zhu (2002) show that while individual investors exhibit the 
disposition effect on average, fully one fifth of the investors do not. Investor 
characteristics that temper the disposition effect include income level, professional 
occupation, and trading experience. It is easy to believe that institutions are immune to 
these behavioral biases since they are better trained, earn more, and have more trading 
experience than retail investors. 
 
In the next three sections, we seek to distinguish between these three classes of 
explanations and in doing so, better understand what motivates institutional investor 
performance dependence.   
  
4. Do capital constraints and risk management concerns drive 
institutional investor behavior? 
  
One interpretation of the results in the previous section is that institutional investors face 
capital constraints. These capital constraints tighten following losses and ease up 
following gains.  Hence these investors mechanically increase risk following an increase 
in net P&L. Also it may be that institutional investors care a lot about downside risk and 
hence impose strict maximum drawdown rules which require that they drastically 
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minimize exposures upon suffering a large enough loss. Here, the observed performance 
dependence is exclusively driven by their reaction to losses.  
 
In this section, we empirically test whether the observed performance dependence is 
driven by capital constraints and risk management concerns. We approach the issue from 
several fronts.  
 
First, on one hand, if capital constraints are biting, then the response to gains and to 
losses should be somewhat symmetric and permanent. A gain of $1 million will allow the 
fund to permanently increase its currency exposure, while a loss of $1 million will 
require the fund to permanently reduce its currency exposure. On the other hand, if 
institutional investors are driven exclusively by stop-loss rules, then their response to 
gains will be zero, while their response to losses will be significant. Hence it will be 
useful to examine the effects of gains and losses separately. 
 
Second, if institutional investor performance dependence is driven by stop-loss rules, 
then it must be that losses only affect risk taking when losses (as a percentage of 
holdings) are large enough. Funds only cut exposures when losses exceed a certain 
cutoff. We would not expect small losses (as a percentage of holdings) to have any 
tangible effect on risk taking. To this end, we re-examine the relationship between risk 
taking and P&L after conditioning for the level of losses as a percentage of holdings.  
 
Third, any capital constraint or maximum drawdown rule manifests at the fund level. A 
large loss on the yen forces a fund to cut its exposures on not just the yen, but on its other 
currencies as well. For the performance dependence to be triggered by capital constraints 
or cutoff rules, it must be that cross-currency effects are present. To check this, for each 
currency, we see how funds’ risking taking on that currency is affected by the P&L from 
their other currency trades. 
 
To address the first issue, we distinguish between the dynamic effects of gains and losses. 
Figure 6 plots separate impulse response functions for gains and losses, estimated from 
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the fund-by-fund data panel.12 There is in fact a striking difference in the two response 
functions. Gains produce transitory increases in risk taking that taper off after about six 
weeks. Beyond that there is evidence of “take-profit” activity as the impulse response 
function turns statistically negative. By contrast, the effects of losses are both stronger 
and more permanent. Note that the impulse response function sketched in the lower left-
hand corner of Figure 4 is simply an average of these two functions. The implication is 
that the relatively short-lived average effect illustrated there masks separate effects of 
gains that appear to be less durable and losses that appear to be more durable. 
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
The pronounced asymmetry between the effects of a gain and those of a loss, and the 
transient reaction to gains, suggest that it is unlikely that capital constraints are 
exclusively responsible for the performance dependence. However, it may be that funds 
do not always, but nonetheless have the option to (given the relaxation of capital 
constraints), increase their exposures following gains. This would explain the smaller 
effects of gains on risk-taking but leaves unanswered why the effects of gains are much 
less durable than those of losses. Also, since gains do precipitate an increase in risk 
taking, maximum drawdown or cutoff rules cannot be responsible for all of the observed 
performance dependence. As discussed earlier, such rules only take effect in the event of 
large losses.  
 
 A natural question to ask at this stage is: How large do losses have to be in order for 
institutional investors to react to them? The view that institutions react to P&L via 
maximum drawdown or cutoff rules necessarily implies that this reaction is driven by 
only the most extreme data points. To test this, we evaluate the effects of a small loss and 
a large loss on risk taking. A small loss is defined as the loss when net return or (change 
in P&L / initial holdings) is less than zero but greater than a predetermined (and negative) 
bound. A large loss is defined as the loss when net return or (change in P&L / initial 
holdings) is less than a predetermined cutoff. We consider cutoffs of -0.001, -0.0015, -
                                                 
12 The results from the other levels of aggregation are similar. 
 18
0.002, -0.0025, -0.004, -0.005, and -0.02 which correspond roughly to the 50th, 40th, 30th, 
20th, 10th, 5th, and 1st percentiles for negative values of weekly change in P&L / holdings 
respectively. If the observed reaction to losses is driven by institutional investors 
following cutoff rules, then it should be that there exists a reasonably large and negative 
cutoff on returns such that investors do not react to losses smaller in magnitude than this 
cutoff. In fact this is not what we find.  
 
[Table II here] 
 
Table II presents the results. Over the entire range of cutoffs, investors cut risk whenever 
they experience a small loss.  The reaction of risk to small losses is statistically 
significant for all cutoffs equal to or below the 40th percentile. Unless we make the 
drastic assumption that cutoff rules are implemented 40 percent of the time whenever 
there is a loss, the view that institutional performance dependence is driven by cutoff 
rules cannot hold. Indeed, the reaction of risk to large losses below the 5th percentile is 
negative at the first lag and insignificantly positive thereafter. Also the reaction to small 
losses is stronger than the reaction to large losses for the extreme cutoffs of -0.005 and -
0.02, corresponding to a 5th and 1st percentile net return respectively. Hence, we find that 
the risk taking reaction to losses is robust over a wide range of losses, and cannot be 
explained by simple cutoff trading rules.13 
 
We next test for the presence of cross-currency effects. This will allow us to see if the 
reaction to gains and losses takes place at the portfolio level or at the account level. If 
capital constraints are binding then a large loss on the yen account will force a fund to 
scale back exposures on its other accounts as well. To check this, for each fund and each 
                                                 
13 One concern is the horizon of the regression variables may be too long to adequately capture stop loss 
behavior. For example, suppose a fund enters into a EUR/USD transaction, and in the short-term earns a 
profit of 10% on the trade. If the fund uses relative stop loss rules, then the fund may initiate stop loss 
activities once profit goes back down to -1% (since this represents a loss of 10% on the most recent high). 
We will not capture this effect unless the horizon is short enough. Another problem is that we may not be 
capturing the stop loss reaction to very bad trades if we aggregate over too long a horizon. To mitigate 
these concerns, we re-do the analysis using daily variables instead of weekly variables. We find that the 
results are qualitatively very similar. Unless we make the drastic assumption that stop loss rules are 
triggered more than 50% of the time when a loss occurs, risk management concerns cannot explain the 
effects of daily losses on daily changes in risk.    
 19
currency, we define conjugate P&L as the P&L on the other currencies traded by a fund. 
Then, for each currency, we estimate the vector autoregression with risk, P&L, and 
conjugate P&L as state variables. The coefficient estimates on the conjugate P&L lags 
presented in Table III suggest that cross-currency effects do not drive the performance 
dependence.  
 
[Table III here] 
 
Note that the coefficients are naturally much smaller than the own P&L coefficients 
shown in Table I, since conjugate P&L is a much larger quantity on average than own 
currency P&L. No clear pattern emerges from the conjugate coefficients in Table III. If 
we focus on the major currencies, there is some mild evidence from the point estimates 
that portfolio profits increase risk-taking in the British pound, the Australian dollar and 
Japanese yen, but this doesn't appear to be statistically significant. Only for the euro do 
we find significant evidence of an effect. Yet, this appears to be a negative one. These 
results suggest that performance dependence manifests at the account and not at the 
portfolio level. This, in turn, casts serious doubt on the view that the risk and P&L 
relationship we observe is driven by capital constraints.  
 
Overall the findings of the section have shed further light on what drives the institutional 
investor reaction to P&L. We find that the reactions to gains and losses are highly 
asymmetric. We document a small and transient reaction to gains, and a large and durable 
reaction to losses. Also, the relationship between risk taking and past losses holds over a 
wide range of loss cutoffs suggesting that maximum drawdown rules are not responsible 
for the bulk of the reaction to losses. Further, this relationship manifests at the account 
and not at the portfolio level. Cross currency effects are noticeably absent. This casts 
doubt on capital constraints as a viable explanation for the performance dependence. 
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5. Do momentum strategies and managerial performance 
incentives explain institutional investor behavior? 
 
There are two other important non-behavioral reasons why we may observe the 
performance dependence documented in Section 3. First, institutions may engage in 
momentum trading. In their study of the Finnish market, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) 
find that sophisticated foreign investors tend to be momentum traders while domestic 
investors tend to be contrarians. What of the institutional investors in our sample? 
Second, managerial performance incentives may be driving the performance dependence. 
Many managers receive incentive fees that create option-like payoffs based on 
performance. These option-like payoffs can cause risk taking to fluctuate in response to 
past performance. 
 
In this section, we investigate the possibility that the performance dependence is driven 
by these explanations. The results from the previous section suggest that the momentum 
story has difficulty explaining the observed performance dependence. One problem is 
that it does not explain why losses have much greater effects than gains. For the results in 
Figure 6 to square with a momentum trading story, it must be that institutions believe that 
momentum is stronger when they are facing losses than when they are facing gains.  To 
further test the view that the performance dependence is driven by momentum trading, 
we include lags of past currency returns signed by holdings in our baseline currency-by-
currency vector autoregressions (Table I). The statistical significances of the P&L lags in 
the regressions are robust to this adjustment. Hence momentum trading does not drive the 
observed risk reaction to losses and gains. 
 
The view that managerial performance incentives (which are most likely a function of 
overall fund performance, unless we assume that within the same fund, there is a manager 
for the euro account and another manager for the yen account, etc) drive the observed 
performance dependence implies that such dependence should surface at the portfolio 
level and not just at the account level. The conjugate currency results (Table III) 
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discussed in the previous section suggest that this is not true. Further, managerial 
incentives, like bonuses, create convexity in payoffs which would tend to give rise to 
increased risk-taking in the wake of losses. A manager who is down during her 
performance period is effectively holding an out-of-the-money call option, and so may 
seek to increase risk in the knowledge that, in a bad outcome, she is no worse off (unless 
she gets fired) whereas in a good outcome, her option may pay out. This argument holds 
even if the manager is not an employee, but co-owns or owns the fund. This is because 
her compensation is likely to be a function of the net inflows into the fund, and many 
authors have shown that fund flows go overwhelmingly into the best return funds 
(Guercio and Tkac, 2001; Gruber, 1996) but are slow to leave poorly performing funds, 
creating again convex payoff structures. Increased risk taking following losses is clearly 
not what we find. Hence, it does not appear that the performance incentives, which may 
be motivated in turn by the flow / performance relationship for mutual funds or by 
managerial bonuses, drive our results. 
 
6. Do behavioral biases influence institutional investor 
behavior?  
 
The results from the previous sections, while inconsistent with the view that institutional 
investor performance dependence is motivated by capital constraints, risk management 
concerns, momentum strategies, or managerial incentives, are consistent with several 
behavioral explanations. First, the reaction to gains and losses (Figure 6) is consistent 
with dynamic loss aversion where investor risk aversion increases following losses and 
falls following gains (Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001).  Second, the increase in risk-
taking following gains (Figure 6, top panel) is also consistent with overconfidence among 
institutional investors. That is they misattribute their recent success to their own abilities 
and take on greater risk. Third, the conjugate currency results (Table III) are consistent 
with the concept of narrow framing discussed in Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) and 
Barberis and Huang (2002), and expounded in Kahneman’s (2003) Nobel lecture, where 
an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble to some extent in isolation, 
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separate from her other risks. Our conjugate currency results suggest that institutions 
frame currency decisions at the account or currency level and not at the portfolio or fund 
level. For risk taking, past own currency P&L matter but not the past P&L on the firm’s 
other currency accounts. Our results are however not suggestive of the disposition effect 
as that implies that agents hold on to their losing trades and thereby increase risk after 
encountering paper losses. The risk and past P&L relationship in the presence of 
disposition effects should therefore be negative instead of positive as in Figure 4.  
 
In this section, we provide further evidence to pin down and flesh out the behavioral 
explanations for the observed performance dependence. First, assuming that performance 
evaluations (i.e., performance reviews and the determination of bonuses) occur at the end 
of the year, then it is likely that managers become more sensitive to losses and the 
accumulation of losses in the later half of the year. Hence overconfidence effects (if any) 
should diminish while dynamic loss aversion effects (if any) should grow over the 
calendar year.  
 
Figure 7 suggests that this happens. It measures the impulse response functions shown in 
Figure 6 separately for each half of the calendar year. It is clear that managers are 
conditionally more risk-tolerant in the first half of the year. Gains in the first half of the 
year lead to incremental risk-taking, but there is no such evidence in the second half of 
the year. Correspondingly, losses in the first half produce very little reduction in risk. It is 
only in the second half of the year that managers systematically cut risk following losses.  
 
[Figure 7 here] 
 
The clear message is that performance dependence varies in a systematic way over the 
calendar period. This is hard to reconcile with a capital constraints or a maximum 
drawdown story. It is difficult to understand why capital constraints would produce such 
a pattern in risk-taking. For this to happen, it must be that in the first half of the year 
capital constraints are binding more often when there is a gain, and in the second half of 
the year they are binding more often when there is a loss. It is also difficult to understand 
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why cutoff rules should matter more in the later part of the year. The behavioral stories 
explain the results in Figure 7 nicely. In the first half the year managers simply care less 
about losses and the accumulation of losses. Hence overconfidence effects reign. In the 
second half, when performance evaluation looms, managers become extra sensitive to 
losses and become even more sensitive to strings of losses. Thus the overconfidence 
effects make way for dynamic loss aversion effects. 
 
It is true, however, that this calendar effect is consistent with the notion that fund 
managers are responding rationally to performance-based incentives. If performance is 
assessed over the calendar year, then as the year draws to a close, the delta of a the 
incentive option rises towards unity for a manager who is up on the year, and falls 
towards zero for a manager who is down on the year. This diminishes the reward to risk-
taking. However, as discussed in Section 5, such convex payoff structures cannot explain 
the overall risk reaction to losses, and the conjugate currency results. It appears, then, that 
although performance incentives are relevant, they are far from the whole story. 
 
 
Second, according to Barber and Odean (2000) and Dhar and Zhu (2002), older and more 
experienced retail investors are less overconfident than younger and less experienced 
retail investors. Locke and Mann (2001) use this fact to empirically discriminate between 
overconfidence and dynamic loss aversion. We look for a similar pattern among 
institutional investors. To this end, the sample is split into a formation period - December 
31, 1993 to December 31, 1999 - and an evaluation period - January 1, 2000 to January 1, 
2003. A fund's age is proxied by the fund's first trade date during the formation period, 
and fund experience is gauged by the numbers of days during the formation period that 
the fund actually traded. Then we use a simple two-step procedure. In step one, the 
sensitivity of each fund to lagged P&L is measured across the evaluation period. Then in 
step two, the cross-section of coefficients is regressed on fund age and fund experience. 
 
[Table IV here] 
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Table IV reports the results for the first lag of the regression coefficient on total profits, 
total gains, and total losses. Both age and experience exert a statistically significant 
mitigating effect on the total profit coefficient at the first lag. This suggests that the 
performance dependence we have observed is sensitive to learning, as in the confidence 
model of Gervais and Odean (2001). More interesting, though, is the fact that, once 
again, the effect is asymmetric for gains and losses. Age and experience tend not only to 
decrease the magnitude of the coefficient on lagged gains, but also to increase the 
magnitude of the coefficient on lagged losses. So the older, wiser funds eschew added 
risk in the wake of gains, but cut risk more aggressively in the wake of losses. 
 
While the results from this exercise suggest that overconfidence effects are manifest in 
institutional investors’ reaction to gains, they also suggest that older and more 
experienced funds are more affected by dynamic loss aversion than younger and less 
experienced funds. This makes intuitive sense given that texts giving investment advice 
often warn investors against holding on to their losses. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
finance practitioners take such “disciplined” trading advice seriously. Experienced and 
older managers are more likely to have internalized such advice than less experienced 
and younger managers.    
 
Needless to say, young and inexperienced funds do not necessarily employ young and 
inexperienced managers. The example of a senior fund manager, with a wealth of trading 
experience, who starts a new currency fund, comes to mind. Privacy issues with the 
custody dataset prevent us from conditioning directly on the age and experience of the 
manager. Our use of fund age and experience is likely to introduce noise into the cross-
sectional analysis. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that we still obtain such strong results 
with the noisy estimate of age and experience.    
 
It is important to square the results with the extant literature on the disposition effect. 
Odean (1988), Linnainmaa (2003), and Locke and Mann (2003) find that retail investors, 
day traders, and futures floor traders are susceptible to disposition effects. They tend to 
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hold on to their losers for too long and sell their winners too quickly. Why is it that the 
institutional investors in our sample do not seem prone to such behavior?  
 
One interpretation is that the disposition effects operate at very short horizons (i.e., daily) 
as opposed to the weekly or monthly horizons. To check this, we re-estimate the vector 
autoregression in Figure 6 for daily changes in risk and daily changes in P&L. We find 
again that investors increase risk following gains and reduce risk following losses. 
Another interpretation is that investors are prone to the disposition effect but appear 
otherwise if we only look at their currency accounts. For example, bond funds may be 
holding on to their loser bonds for too long and selling their winner bonds too quickly. If 
bond P&L is negatively correlated with currency P&L for these funds, then this may be 
responsible for the results we find. While we cannot completely rule out this explanation, 
the fact that our results hold with pure currency funds14, and that funds seem to frame 
their risk taking decisions at the currency by currency level (Table III) suggest that that 
this is unlikely to drive our results. One other interpretation is that institutional investors 
are less prone to disposition effects simply because they are more disciplined than other 
investors and have internalized the standard investment advice to not hold on to their 
losses. This view agrees with our intuition on retail investors and day traders. It also 
dovetails with the Dhar and Zhu (2002) finding that investors who are better trained, 
more educated, and more experienced are less prone to disposition effects.   
 
It is worth emphasizing that our results are first and foremost about the preferences of 
institutions. We assume that performance contracts, compensation, managerial trading, 
and the like are all in place to align managerial incentives with what is best for the fund. 
That is managers are acting in the best interest of the funds. While studies like Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997)15 have raised issues concerning the layer of agency between the 
manager and the fund, a detailed analysis of this matter is beyond the scope of this 
investigation.   
                                                 
14 All our main results hold with the pure currency funds subsample. 
15 Among their main findings is an incentive by managers to gamble at the end of the calendar year. We 
find, on the contrary, that managers in our sample tend to be more conservative at the end of the year than 
at the start of the year (Figure 7). Hence, it is unlikely that the incentive to gamble, which is motivated in 
turn by the flow / performance relationship for mutual funds, drives our results.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
The unique nature of our dataset has allowed us to learn much about performance 
dependence among institutional investors. One could summarize what we have learnt as 
follows. Past performance manifestly affects currency risk-taking behavior among 
institutions. But the effects of gains and losses are dramatically different. Gains elicit a 
mild increase in risk-taking while losses precipitate a large and durable reduction in risk. 
These effects are not confined to a few select investors. They are pervasive across the 
major currencies, accounting for more than 95% of the trading volume in the majors. 
 
Risk management concerns or stop-loss rules do not seem to drive such behavior since 
the reaction to losses occurs for a wide range of loss cutoffs. Further, we find that cross-
currency effects are noticeably absent. Investors seem to frame their risk-taking decisions 
narrowly at the currency by currency level. Since these effects occur at the account level 
and not at the portfolio level, it is unlikely that capital constraints are at the root of such 
performance dependence. Moreover, momentum trading cannot account for such 
behavior; the addition of momentum proxies fails to drive out the importance of past 
P&L on risk-taking.  Also, managerial performance incentives create convex-like payoff 
structures which should induce managers to increase risk following losses. Since this is 
not what we find, our results are unlikely to be driven by managerial response to 
performance incentives.   
 
Finally, these effects vary over the calendar year and across funds with different age and 
trading experience. The effects of gains dominate in the first half of the year while the 
effects of losses dominate in the second half. We conjecture that this is related to the 
performance evaluation cycle for fund managers. Also older and more experienced funds 
do not increment their risk-taking following gains as much as younger and less 
experienced funds, and are assiduous in cutting risks once losses occur.  
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Taken together, our results are consistent with the behavioral explanations of narrow 
framing, dynamic loss aversion, and overconfidence. Also they are supportive of the view 
that institutional investors are better trained and more disciplined than retail investors or 
day traders.    
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Figure 1: Holdings by currency aggregated across all funds. The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002.
Figure 2: Risk exposure by currency aggregated across all funds. The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002.
Figure 3: Daily sample autocorrelation functions for risk and P&L aggregates. The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The
dotted lines are 95% confidence bounds.
Figure 4: Impulse response functions for shocks to risk and P&L. The sample period is from January 1995 to Deecember 2003. The sample
includes 10 currencies and 512 funds. The aggregated by fund and currency panel consists of a series of length T, where T is the length of the
sample period. The aggregated by currency panel consists of 10 currency by currency series of length T. The aggregated by fund panel consists
of 512 fund by fund series of various lenghts depending on fund life. To generate the impulse response functions, panel VARs for risk and P&l
are estimated. The lag length of each VAR is set at 13 weeks, the value selected by the Bayes-Schwartz Information Criterion for the aggregated
by fund panel regression. The VARs allow for heteroskedasticity across currencies and funds. The vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation
units of risk and P&L. The dotted lines sketched around each function are 90% confidence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood
standard errors. 
Figure 5: Impulse response of risk to shocks in P&L broken down by fund type. The impulse
response functions are generated from a 13-lag bivariate panel VAR for risk and P&L. The sample
period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The model allows for heterscedasticity across
funds. Estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood, stacking all of the funds in the sample. The
vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation units of risk. The dotted lines sketched around each
function are 90% confidence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors. 
Figure 6: Fund panel impulse response functions for gains and losses. The sample period is from
January 1995 to December 2002. To generate the impulse response functions, risk is regressed on
weekly lags of P&L conditional on gains and weekly lags of P&L conditional on losses for the fund
panel. The regression allows for heteroskedasticity across funds and uses the same lag structure as
the VARs in Figure 4. The dotted lines sketched around each function are 90% confidence interval
bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
Figure 7: Fund panel impulse response functions for the first and second half of the calendar year. The sample period is from January 1995 to
December 2002. The sample is split into the first half of the year (H1) and the second half of the year (H2). To generate the impulse response
functions, risk is regressed on weekly lags of risk, weekly lags of P&L conditional on gains and weekly lags of P&L conditional on losses for
each fund, for each subsample. The regression allows for heteroskedasticity across funds and uses the same lag structure as the VARs in Figure
4. The dotted lines sketched around each function are 90% confidence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
P&L(t-1) P&L(t-2) P&L(t-3) P&L(t-4) P&L(t-5) P&L(t-6) P&L(t-7) P&L(t-8)
Denmark -0.85 1.91 5.12 1.19 1.71 -2.31 -2.89 0.34
(1.86) (1.85) (1.85) (1.85) (1.89) (1.9) (1.88) (1.88)
Norway 10.38 12.14 -0.79 3.91 -3.05 -0.58 7.61 24.94
(8.67) (8.67) (8.65) (8.67) (8.7) (8.67) (8.66) (8.69)
Sweden -6.27 -6.02 3.47 -10.15 0.24 5.18 -13.2 -2.34
(4.54) (4.52) (4.51) (4.51) (4.55) (4.54) (4.52) (4.53)
Switzerland 9.4 2.99 12.58 10.01 4.84 4.13 5.62 3
(4.85) (4.88) (4.89) (4.9) (4.92) (4.94) (4.92) (4.93)
UK 3.3 29.2 26.62 0.82 28.86 10.69 2.11 18.68
(4.67) (4.67) (4.66) (4.46) (4.44) (4.44) (4.45) (4.41)
Australia 21.45 23.35 13.18 -12.75 -6.7 22.77 23.72 19.81
(5.59) (5.58) (5.55) (5.52) (5.49) (5.48) (5.41) (5.47)
Japan 17.75 14.42 15.33 5.58 -2.01 -5.38 5.98 -7.62
(4.24) (4.24) (4.25) (4.24) (4.24) (4.25) (4.24) (4.24)
NZ -26.89 -6.9 -1.61 -1.48 -7.92 -20.91 -5.52 -5.63
(5.68) (5.67) (5.71) (5.61) (5.62) (5.64) (5.6) (5.6)
Canada 10.64 13.87 10.32 1.78 -17.36 -8.61 -5.16 -5.7
(6.26) (6.25) (6.23) (6.21) (6.21) (6.19) (6.19) (6.19)
Euro 19.64 10.8 8.23 -3.94 -5.32 1.45 -7.07 -12.67
(4.27) (4.26) (4.26) (4.27) (4.28) (4.28) (4.26) (4.26)
This table shows the first eight coefficients on lagged P&L from a 13-lag bivariate panel VAR for
risk and P&L. The dependent variable is risk. The sample period is from January 1995 to
December 2002. The model allows for heterscedasticity across funds. Estimation is carried out by
maximum likelihood, stacking all of the funds in the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The estimates are shown broken down by currency.
Table I
Panel VAR estimates broken down by currency
Cutoff return(%) Small_loss(t-1) Small_loss(t-2) Small_loss(t-3) Small_loss(t-4) Large_loss(t-1) Large_loss(t-2) Large_loss(t-3) Large_loss(t-4)
-0.1 5.83 24.86 13.56 -8.84 15.52 19.02 8.28 -19.43
[50%tile] (4.85) (4.83) (4.85) (4.83) (19.03) (19) (18.99) (18.98)
-0.15 5.4 24.35 14.56 -8.54 20.15 45.31 13.96 4.96
[40%tile] (4.84) (4.83) (4.84) (4.82) (12.73) (12.75) (12.73) (12.7)
-0.2 3.97 24.36 13.53 -9.28 15.8 23.15 14.27 -3.98
[30%tile] (4.95) (4.93) (4.95) (4.93) (9.68) (9.69) (9.68) (9.66)
-0.25 6.84 27.3 14.62 -10.54 2.55 15.26 11.94 1.32
[20%tile] (5.19) (5.17) (5.19) (5.17) (8.09) (8.09) (8.08) (8.07)
-0.4 3.28 20.26 0.6 -10.94 8.08 28.81 25.13 -5.1
[10%tile] (6.66) (6.64) (6.64) (6.62) (6.06) (6.04) (6.06) (6.06)
-0.5 -5.7 7.21 0.48 -12.27 10.06 30.47 18.5 -7.67
[5%tile] (8.56) (8.56) (8.55) (8.53) (5.47) (5.45) (5.47) (5.46)
-2 55.18 1.49 28.75 -10.4 4.8 25.7 14.41 -8.15
[1%tile] (26.8) (26.8) (26.79) (26.8) (4.89) (4.87) (4.88) (4.87)
Table II
The reaction of risk to losses conditional on the size of the return. 
This table shows the first four coefficients on lagged P&L conditional on small negative returns and large negative returns from a 13-lag bivariate
panel VAR for risk and P&L. The dependent variable is risk. The independent variables are lagged risk, lagged P&L conditional on a gain, lagged
P&L conditional on a small negative return, and lagged P&L conditional on a large negative return. For each negative return cutoff, a small negative
return is any return that is greater than the cutoff, while a large negative return is any return that is less than the cutoff. The sample period is from
January 1995 to December 2002. The model allows for heterscedasticity across funds. Estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood, stacking all of
the funds in the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. The positions of the cutoffs in the distribution of negative returns are in brackets.
conjP&L(t-1) conjP&L(t-2) conjP&L(t-3) conjP&L(t-4) conjP&L(t-5) conjP&L(t-6) conjP&L(t-7) conjP&L(t-8)
Denmark 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Norway -0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.14 0 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Sweden 0.15 -0.04 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Switzerlan -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
UK 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 0 0.07 -0.03 -0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Australia 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.32 0.12 0.01
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Japan 0.79 -0.33 -0.89 0.66 -1.26 -0.46 -0.32 0.51
(0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.61) (0.62)
NZ 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Canada 0.02 -0.02 0.1 0.1 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Euro -0.68 -0.91 -0.05 0.47 -0.81 1.17 0.34 -0.2
(0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27)
This table shows the first eight coefficients on lagged conjugate P&L from a regression that also has lagged risk and lagged own P&L as
regressors. The dependent variable is risk. Conjugate P&L is defined as the profit or loss on all currencies except the regressand currency. The
sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The model allows for heterscedasticity across funds. Estimation is carried out by
maximum likelihood, stacking all of the funds in the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Conjugate P&L results by currency
Table III
P&L (t-1) P&L conditional on gain (t-1) P&L conditional on loss (t-1)
Age -1.36 -3.47 0.67
(0.65) (1.14) (1.02)
Experience -1.71 -5.72 2.49
(0.91) (1.56) (1.39)
Table IV
The effects of age and experience on performance dependence
This table illustrates the effect of age and experience on performance dependence. The sample
period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The sample is split into two periods: An
evaluation period (the last three years of the sample, January 2000 to December 2002) and a
formation period (the intial five years of the sample, January 1995 to December 1999). A
fund's age is proxied by the length of time since the first day of trading in the formation period
sample, and experience proxied by the number of days trading in the formation period. To test
sensitivity to these two variables, we use a simple two-step procedure. In step one, the
sensitivity of each fund to lagged P&L, lagged P&L conditonal on a loss, or lagged P&L
conditional on a gain is measured separately across the evaluation period. Then in step two, the
cross-section of coefficients is regressed on age and fund experience. Standard errors in
parentheses.
